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A comparative analysis of English and French defences to demonstrate the 
limitations of the concept of loss of control 
 
Catherine Elliott1 
 
Introduction 
The most important change to the partial defences to murder by the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009 was the introduction of fear of serious violence as a possible trigger for the 
defence.2  Up until this reform, the emphasis of the defence of provocation had been on 
anger leading a person to loose their control because of things said or done.  Now, the 
emotion of fear as well as anger can be the basis for the new defence of loss of control.   
A key reason for introducing this reform was to achieve justice for battered women who 
killed their abusive partners.  This reformed version of the defence has similarities with 
self-defence3 and the statutory public defence4 (together referred to in this article as self-
defence).  Historically, self-defence has rarely succeeded in removing criminal liability 
for women who have killed their abusive partners.  This article will compare the fear of 
serious violence branch of the loss of control excuse and self-defence to see where the 
former will succeed when the latter will not.  It is only where loss of control extends 
beyond the scope of self-defence that the new branch of the law will have any impact, 
since where there is an option to rely on either defence, an accused would logically 
favour the complete defence of self-defence over the partial one of loss of control.  This 
comparison will show that not only does the new defence share similar constraints to the 
old one of self-defence, but it also contains an additional constraint that the accused must 
have lost their control.  The significant overlap of these defences combined with the 
additional constraint of loss of control renders the new extension relating to a fear of 
serious violence close to redundant. 
The English defences will then be compared with the approach taken in French 
criminal law.  Through this comparison it will be argued that the Government was 
misguided in clinging onto the concept of loss of control as the basis of a defence for 
battered women who kill.  Instead, a three pronged approach needs to be taken to make 
sure that justice is done in such cases.  Firstly, the law on self-defence should be 
developed so that it ceases to be a sexist defence that is more likely to succeed for male 
defendants than female defendants.  This could be done by changing the burden of proof 
where the defendant had been subjected to physical or mental abuse by the victim.  
Secondly, a new partial defence of self-preservation could be created which would be 
available where a court concluded that excessive force had been used in an attempt at 
self-preservation, reducing the defendant’s liability from murder to manslaughter.  
Finally, the sentencing arrangements could be revisited to make sure that the sentence 
matches the gravity of the attack in the context of a fatal attack on a victim of domestic 
abuse.    
 
Comparing self-defence and loss of control      
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The old defences of self-defence and the public defence are available where the 
defendant feared serious violence, as with the loss of control defence.  A comparison 
between self-defence and the fear of serious violence branch of the loss of control 
defence, will demonstrate that the reasons why self-defence has not succeeded for 
battered women who kill will also create problems for the application of the new defence.  
In addition, a battered woman relying on the partial defence will have to prove that she 
had lost control of herself.  This was a logical requirement when the defence of 
provocation was built on the notion of defendants losing their temper, but illogical when 
the defence is based on a rational fear of serious violence.   
There are three key elements of these defences which need to be examined in 
order to determine how far the defences differ: the timing of the defendant’s response to 
the fear of serious violence, the proportionate response to the threat; and the requirement 
of loss of control.  Each of these three issues will be considered in turn.   
 
The timing of the defendant’s response to the fear of serious violence 
For self-defence to succeed it must have been necessary for the defendants to have taken 
defensive action and their response must have been proportionate.  In determining 
whether it was necessary to take defensive action, there must have existed an imminent 
threat.  This does not mean that defendants have to wait until they are hit, for example, 
before hitting back, but it does mean there must be some immediacy about the threat 
posed.5   
 Thus, on first impressions a factual situation where the defence of loss of control 
may be available and self-defence not, is where the threat of serious violence was not 
imminent.  But while the threat of violence need not be imminent for the defence of loss 
of control, timing is not irrelevant to the defence.  Under the new defence, there is no 
longer any requirement that the defendant’s response must be sudden,6 but the 
explanatory notes to the Act state that delay could be evidence as to whether defendants 
had actually lost their self-control.7  Where there is a delay then there is a greater 
possibility that the defendant acted out of calculated revenge and s. 54(4) expressly states 
that the defence is not available if the defendant ‘acted in a considered desire for 
revenge.’  Thus the potential for defendants who were not viewed as having reacted to an 
imminent threat to argue that they still came within the defence of loss of control will be 
quite limited.   
 
A proportionate response 
Self-defence is only allowed if the defendant has used a reasonable amount of force.  This 
has proved to be the most controversial issue in practice.  Section 76(6) of the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 provides:  
 
“S. 76(6) The degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been 
reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be if it was 
disproportionate in those circumstances.” 
 
                                                 
5
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What constitutes reasonable force is a matter for the jury to decide, balancing the amount 
of force used against the harm the accused sought to prevent – so that, for example, force 
considered reasonable for protecting a person might be considered excessive if used to 
prevent a crime against property.  Defendants are not expected to perform precise 
calculations in the heat of the moment as to the minimum amount of force required in the 
circumstances.8  The law recognises that in the kind of situation where the defence is 
used, there is rarely much time to consider what should be done.  As Lord Morris put it in 
Palmer:  
 
“A person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his 
necessary defensive action.”9 
 
The law imposes an objective test, so it does not matter if the defendant thought they 
were using a reasonable amount of force, what matters is whether objectively they 
actually have used a reasonable amount of force.  The Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008 restates the requirement of reasonable force in this context,10 confirming the 
case law on the point.11  
The objective test was confirmed in the high-profile case of R v Anthony Martin,12 
though it was watered down slightly because the Court of Appeal left open the possibility 
of sometimes taking into account specific characteristics of the accused when applying 
this test.  The defence barrister submitted that in deciding the issue of reasonable force 
the courts ought to take the same approach as the House of Lords laid down in Smith 
(Morgan)13 for the objective test in provocation.  This would have enabled the 
defendant’s characteristics to be considered when determining whether his or her reaction 
had been reasonable, which in this case would include the fact that Martin suffered from 
a paranoid personality disorder.  The Court of Appeal accepted that the jury could take 
into account the physical characteristics of the defendant.  They also stated that, in 
exceptional circumstances that rendered the evidence especially probative, judges could 
take into account the fact that the defendant was suffering from a psychiatric condition.  
But this was not such an exceptional case, and the court found on the facts that 
reasonable force had not been used.   
Thus, self-defence is only available to women who kill their abusive partners if 
the force used by the women is reasonable and necessary to protect them from an 
imminent attack. It is, therefore, not available to an abused woman who fears violence in 
the future and kills her abuser when, for example, he is asleep or has his back to her.  
Aileen McColgan has argued that the law discriminates against women in this context: 
“The relative scarcity of female killers has resulted in a paradigmatically male ideal 
model and this, together with the incompatibility of aggressive force with 
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stereotypical femininity, means that the apparently gender-neutral concept of 
reasonableness is actually weighted against the female defendant.”14 
 
In addition, Edwards has pointed to research which shows significant differences between 
the way men and women kill. Men who kill their female partners tend to use bodily force 
whilst women who kill their male partners use knives in 83 per cent of cases. Where 
weapons such as knives are used a conviction for murder is more likely.15  Edwards has 
argued that self-defence has been: 
 
“skewed to the detriment of women since a defendant's action is only considered 
‘reasonable’ when the killing is a proportionate response to an immediate threat of 
deadly force.”16 
 
The new loss of control defence does not specify that the defendant must not use 
excessive force, but it specifies that the defence is only available if a person of the 
defendant’s sex and age with an ordinary level of tolerance and self-restraint and in the 
circumstances of the defendant might have acted in the same or similar way to the 
defendant.17  The reference to the defendant’s ‘circumstances’ includes all circumstances 
except those that are only relevant to the defendant’s general level of tolerance and self 
restraint.18  The explanatory notes to the Act provide that a defendant’s history of abuse 
at the hands of the victim could be taken into account when considering whether an 
ordinary person might have behaved as he or she did, whereas the defendant’s short 
temper cannot.19 Under the former defence of provocation the case law referred to the 
defendant’s characteristics rather than their circumstances.  It is not yet clear whether this 
change of terminology will make any real difference, though it may allow a wider range 
of factors to be considered than had been allowed under Attorney-General for Jersey v 
Holley.20  Amanda Clough has suggested:  
 
“Circumstances’ suggests being able to consider prior abuse as an external 
element rather than having to try and deem it as a characteristic by internalising it 
as some kind of syndrome or character flaw.”21 
 
Both the defence of loss of control and the defence of self-defence are therefore restricted 
by the application of an objective test.  These objective tests have slightly different 
nuances but following the shift away from Smith (Morgan)22 the reasonable person 
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reform’ [2004] Crim LR 181, 188.  See also Aileen McColgan, ‘In Defence of Battered Women who Kill’ 
(1993) 13 OJLS 508.  An illustration of the law in practice is Rossiter (1992) 95 Cr App R 326. 
17
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 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 54(3). 
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20
 [2005] 2 AC 58. 
21
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22
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should be quite a consistent individual (though taking into account differences between 
juries). One view is that the objective test for loss of control will be less stringent than the 
objective test for self-defence.  Thus, Withey has observed: 
 
“When comparing the normal person against the defendant's conduct in losing 
self-control, the jury have to ask whether the normal person might have had the 
same or similar reaction. ……The new test could therefore make the defence 
available to those who fail with public and private defence because of an 
excessive use of force.”23 
 
On this logic, where excessive force has been used self-defence will not be available but 
the partial defence may be available because the excess amount of force might be 
explained by the loss of self-control.  In practice, however, the amount of force that might 
be used for self-defence may not differ significantly from the amount of force that would 
be permissible for the new defence of loss of control.  There are circumstances where a 
person will be entitled to kill in self-defence and these are circumstances where a normal 
person in those circumstances would have reacted in this way.  A normal person will 
rarely use a disproportionate amount of force, whatever their circumstances, thus, this 
limitation which has caused controversy in the context of the defence of self-defence may 
well prove problematic in the context of the loss of control defence.  
 
Loss of control 
The new defence is only available where the defendant has lost control.  The Law 
Commission had recommended that the requirement of loss of self-control should be 
dropped altogether because it is the wrongful words or conduct which provide the 
justification for the defence, there was no need for a loss of control to justify providing a 
defence.24  Alan Norrie has noted:  
 
“Indeed to be out of control might take the moral edge off what has been done in 
righteous, but sanctionable, anger [or fear].”25 
 
He has also pointed out that the requirement of loss of control seems to ‘work against the 
core logic of the new defence’. 26 The defence will often only work in practice if the 
meaning of loss of control is strained to include situations which on the surface might not 
really fit.  Thus, has a woman who has suffered years of abuse and eventually kills her 
abusive partner really suffered from a loss of self-control at the time of the killing?  The 
Government chose to keep the concept of loss of control because it thought the concept 
was needed to exclude people who killed in cold blood, particularly as the requirement 
that the killing be sudden was being removed.  However the provision in the legislation 
that the killing could not be committed for revenge would probably have been sufficient. 
                                                 
23
 Carol Withey ‘Loss of control’ (2010) 174 JPN 197, 200. 
24
 Law Commission ‘Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide’ (Law Com No 304, 2006) [5.17]. 
25
 Alan Norrie ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 - partial defences to murder (1) Loss of control’ [2010] 
Crim LR  275, 278. 
26
 Alan Norrie ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 - partial defences to murder (1) Loss of control’ [2010] 
Crim LR  275, 288. 
 6 
The requirement of loss of control is an additional restriction on the availability of 
the new defence which is not required for self-defence.  In the past it was difficult for 
defendants to argue both that they behaved rationally in self-defence and alternatively 
that they lost their self-control due to provocation, as the defences seemed to contradict 
each other.  With this alternative form of the new loss of control defence it might be 
easier to argue self-defence in the alternative, though there remains the complication that 
the Government kept the requirement for a loss of control which the Law Commission 
would have dropped.   
 
Crimes of passion in France and England 
The comparison drawn between self-defence and loss of control has shown that it is far 
from certain whether the new defence of loss of control will make any significant impact 
with regard to its extension to include a fear of serious violence because it will rarely be 
available where the complete defence of self-defence is not available.  At this point it is 
helpful to draw a comparison between the direction that English law has taken in this 
context with the approach to these defences in French criminal law.  The first thing to 
note is that today there is no equivalent defence to provocation or loss of control in 
French law.  Historically there had been a defence available to crimes of passion,27 which 
would have included where a man found his wife in the act of being unfaithful with her 
lover.28  In the 1800s, approximately fifty per cent of trials for a crime of passion would 
result in an acquittal.29  The old Criminal Code was changed in 1832 so that a finding that 
there had been a crime of passion was no longer a complete defence, but rather a 
mitigating factor which could reduce the defendant’s sentence.  Thus the old Napoleonic 
criminal code provided:  
 
“Art. 324.  Murder committed by a husband on his wife, or by the latter on her 
husband, is not excusable, if the life of the husband or the wife who committed 
the murder has not been put in danger at the very moment when the murder took 
place. 
Nevertheless, in the case of adultery, provided for by article 336, murder 
committed by the husband on his wife, as well as on the accomplice, at the 
moment when he surprised them in flagrante delicto in the conjugal home, is 
excusable.”30 
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30
 “Art. 324. Le meurtre commis par l’époux sur l’épouse, ou par celle-ci sur son époux, n’est pas 
excusable, si la vie de l’époux ou de l’épouse qui a commis le meurtre n’a pas été mise en péril dans le 
moment même où le meurtre a eu lieu.  
Néanmoins, dans le cas d’adultère, prévu par l’article 336, le meurtre commis par l’époux sur son 
épouse, ainsi que sur le complice, à l’instant où il les surprend en flagrant délit dans la maison conjugale, 
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Article 326 of the old Criminal Code explained that the sentence imposed could be 
significantly reduced in such cases:  
 “Art. 326.  When the fact of an excuse is proven,  
If it is a question of a serious crime carrying the death penalty, or forced labour 
for perpetuity or deportation, the punishment will be reduced to imprisonment for 
one to five years.  
If it is a question of any other crime, it will be reduced to imprisonment from six 
months to two years.”31 
 
In the past, French juries showed misplaced compassion for defendants in such cases and 
were prepared to acquit defendants despite the fact that the legislation aimed to simply 
reduce liability not excuse defendants altogether.  People who committed a crime of 
passion might be treated as if they were suffering from a brief period of mental ill-health 
and have a defence on this basis.  Paragraph 2 of article 324 was only repealed in 1975.32   
Similarities in the development of the English law regarding crimes of passion 
and the defence of provocation can be noted.  During the medieval period in England, a 
man finding his wife in the act of adultery was entitled to kill her and be acquitted of 
murder.33  Blackstone wrote that such circumstances: 
 
'[Are] of the lowest degree of (manslaughter); and therefore … the court directed 
the burning in the hand to be gently inflicted, because there could not be a greater 
provocation'.34 
 
The defence of provocation was traditionally available when a husband discovered his 
wife committing adultery.35  By the 20th century, with effective divorce laws, the courts 
regarded this leniency as an anachronism and were not prepared to extend the defence to 
engaged or cohabiting couples.36  However, following the passing of the Homicide Act 
1957, any infidelity could potentially amount to provocation.  While by 1975 French 
legislators considered there was no role in a civilised society for a defence or mitigation 
based on loss of control and loss of temper for crimes of passion, in England just before 
the passing of the 2009 Act, a jury found a defendant liable for manslaughter rather than 
murder when he killed his wife and her lover who he claimed were about to engage in 
sexual intercourse.37   
                                                 
31
 “Lorsque le fait d’excuse sera prouvé, 
S’il s’agit d’un crime emportant la peine de mort, ou celle des travaux forcés à perpetuité ou celle de la 
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S’il s’agit de tout autre crime, elle sera réduite à un emprisonnement de six moins à deux ans.” 
32
 Loi du 11 juillet 1975 n° 75-617 portant réforme du divorce, JO p. 7171. 
33
 Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, 1992). 
34
 Manning 16761 T. Raym 212. quoted by Susan Edwards. ‘Anger and fear as justifiable preludes for loss 
of self-control’ (2010) 74 JCL 223, 231. 
35
 R v Mawgridge (1707) Kel J 119 at 137; 84 ER 1107 at 1115.  See further Susan Edwards ‘Abolishing 
provocation and reframing self defence - the Law Commission's options for reform’ [2004] Crim LR 181, 
186. 
36
 R v Palmer [1913] 2 KB 29 at 31, R v Greening [1913] 3 KB 846 at 849, Holmes v DPP  [1946] AC 588 
at 598, per Viscount Simon. 
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The law has moved on in France and, in an effort to tackle the social problem of 
domestic violence, an attack on a spouse, whatever the circumstances, is, since 2006, 
viewed as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating factor.38  The amended article 
132-80 of the new Criminal Code states:  
 
“In the cases laid down by the law, the punishments incurred for a serious crime 
or a major crime are aggravated when the offence is committed by the spouse, the 
lover or the partner linked to the victim by a civil pact.   
The aggravating circumstance laid down in the first paragraph is equally 
applicable when the facts are committed by a former spouse, a former lover or the 
former partner linked to the victim by a civil pact.”39   
 
Where this provision applies, and the offence committed is murder, the maximum 
sentence is increased from 30 years to life imprisonment.  The problem with this 
provision is that it does not draw any distinction between abusive partners who kill and 
partners who are themselves the victim of domestic abuse who kill their abusers.  While it 
seems appropriate to treat the former situation as an aggravating factor, it would seem 
more appropriate to treat the latter situation as a mitigating circumstance.   
In England, sexual infidelity has now been expressly removed as a basis for the 
defence of loss of control,40 which in some respects responds to concerns about the sexist 
values underpinning lenient approaches to crimes of passion.  While this exclusion has 
been described as ‘gesture politics’,41 and was subject to considerable criticism during its 
progress through parliament,42 when looked at from the context of historical attitudes in 
France and England to crimes of passion, its exclusion seems completely logical in a 
modern society.  Where the issue of sexual infidelity was raised in the past, a trial risked 
focusing on the deceased's behaviour rather than the defendant's. Inevitably, the deceased 
was not able to answer these accusations and the whole process could be extremely 
distressing to the deceased's family and friends.  An acquittal of murder on grounds of 
provocation could, and often did, appear to relatives of the victim to be a travesty of 
justice. It appeared to imply a judgment by the court that the defendant's responsibility 
for killing the deceased was seriously lessened by the behaviour of the victim. Thus, in a 
case where a defendant had killed through sexual jealousy because the victim had formed 
an association with someone else, a verdict of manslaughter by reason of provocation 
often understandably appeared to the victim's relatives to be an insult added to injury. 
                                                 
38
 Loi n° 2006-399 du 4 avril 2006 renforçant la prévention et la répression des violences au sein du couple 
ou commises contre les mineurs, JO n°81 du 5 avril 2006. 
39
 “Dans les cas prévus par la loi, les peines encourues pour un crime ou un délit sont aggravées lorsque 
l’infraction est commise par le conjoint, le concubin ou le partenaire lié à la victime par un pacte civil de 
solidarité. 
La circonstance aggravante prévue au premier alinéa est également constituée lorsque les faits sont 
commis par l’ancien conjoint, l’ancien concubin ou l’ancien partenaire lié à la victime par un pacte civil 
de solidarité.” 
40
 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 55(6)(c). 
41
 Jo Miles, ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009: a “dog’s breakfast’ of homicide reform’ (2009) Archbold 
News, Legislative Comment, 6, at p 7.   
42
 See for example, Lord Henley and Lord Thomas’ comments on November 11, 2009, HL Deb col 840-
841 and the comments of Claire Ward and  Mr Grieve QC on November 9 2009, HC Deb col 80-90. 
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At the same time, the exclusion of sexual infidelity highlights the 
inappropriateness of basing a defence on loss of control and then excluding the one 
factual situation where a person might have traditionally argued that he or she had lost 
control.  As Susan Edwards has observed:  
 
“Of all 'triggers', sexual infidelity, both done and when spoken about, has been at 
the very epicentre of reasons for loss of self-control accepted and validated by 
law.”43 
 
By then seeking to extend the defence to a person who has both lost control and feared 
serious violence highlights that the two concepts do not really fit together.  The emphasis 
should have been on the fear of serious violence and the necessity for self-preservation 
and the concept of a loss of control is simply a historical distraction.   
 
A comparison with the French defences 
While the law as it stands in France has no separate defence based on a loss of control, 
there is a defence of legitimate defence which is very similar in remit to that of self-
defence and public defence.  Article 122-5 of the Criminal Code lays down the 
parameters of the legitimate defence.  This states:  
 
“A person who, faced with an unjustified attack against themselves or another, 
carries out at that time an act required by the necessity of the legitimate defence 
of themselves or another is not criminally liable, except if there is a disproportion 
between the means of defence used and the gravity of the attack. 
A person who, in order to prevent the commission of a serious or major 
offence against property, carries out an act of defence, other than voluntary 
homicide, when this act is strictly necessary for the goal sought is not criminally 
liable when the means used are proportionate to the gravity of the offence.44 
 
As with the English law, in order for the legitimate defence to apply there must be an 
actual or imminent attack.  For example, if a person is threatened, but the aggressor is 
held back by others on the scene, the person threatened cannot lash out violently at their 
aggressor and then rely on their legitimate defence, as the attack was no longer actual or 
imminent.45  Where the threat is not actual or imminent the defence is not available 
because the individual should have sought the protection of the authorities, rather than 
                                                 
43
 Susan Edwards ‘Anger and fear as justifiable preludes for loss of self-control’ (2010) 74 JCL 223, 
230. 
44
 “N’est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, devant une atteinte injustifiée envers elle-même ou 
autrui, accomplit dans le même temps, un acte commandé par la nécessité de la légitime défense d’elle-
même ou d’autrui, sauf s’il y a disproportion entre les moyens de défense employés et la gravité de 
l’atteinte. 
 N’est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, pour interrompre l’exécution d’un crime ou 
d’un délit contre un bien, accomplit un acte de défense, autre qu’un homicide volontaire, lorsque cet acte 
est strictement nécessaire au but poursuivi dès lors que les moyens sont proportionnés à la gravité de 
l’infraction.” 
45
 Crim. 28 mai 1937, G.P . 1937.2.336. 
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take the law into their own hands.  If there is a time gap between the attack and the 
response, the latter amounts to a revenge attack and the defence is not available.46   
 As with the English law, the defendant is only allowed to use a proportionate 
amount of force against his or her aggressor.  In one case, some people had just climbed 
over a boundary wall and the homeowner had sought to frighten them away by shooting 
into the darkness.  One of the intruders was hit and injured.  The defence was not 
available to the homeowner since he had carelessly used excessive force.47  Where the 
accused mistakenly thinks they are about to be attacked they are entitled to rely on the 
defence if that mistake was reasonable.48   
The legitimate defence is available to protect property, but tighter limitations on 
the defence are placed in this context.49  This is expressly provided for in the second 
paragraph of article 122-5 of the new Criminal Code.  Thus it is sometimes permissible to 
use force against a thief.  Article 122-5 lays down that the violent response must have 
been ‘strictly’ necessary to prevent the attack, an adverb which is not used in the context 
of preventing an offence against the person.  As a result, the defendant should normally 
give the victim a warning before using violence when a property crime is involved.  On 
the issue of proportionality, a voluntary homicide cannot be committed simply to protect 
property.   
As well as the legitimate defence, there is also a general defence of necessity 
which was introduced by the New French Criminal Code in 1994.50  The old Criminal 
Code did not contain a general defence of necessity, but there were certain offences 
which could not be committed where the person acted through necessity, such as 
obstructing the highway51 or having an abortion.52  During the 19th century, the courts 
were reluctant to recognise openly a general defence of necessity, preferring to treat these 
cases as falling under the defence of constraint53 (which is similar to the English defence 
of duress). Alternatively the courts would find defendants not liable on the basis that they 
lacked the requisite intention to commit the offence.54  But both these approaches were 
artificial, since the defence of constraint implies that the defendant was unable to make a 
free choice, but actually when a defendant is acting under necessity he has made a 
positive choice.  For the same reason, such individuals do actually have mens rea, and to 
suggest otherwise is to confuse mens rea with motive.  Eventually, in the 1950s a court of 
first instance recognised the defence of necessity.  A defendant charged with building 
without a permit was acquitted because he was trying to provide decent living conditions 
for his family who had been living in slum accommodation.55  Soon afterwards the Cour 
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 Crim. 4 juill. 1907, B., 243; Crim. 28 mai 1937, G.P. 1937.2.336; Crim 16 oct. 1979, D., 1980, I.R., 522.  
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 Crim. 21 fév. 1996, B., 84, obs. Bouloc, R.S.C., 1996, p. 849; Paris, 9 oct. 1979, J.C.P ., 1979.II.19232, 
note Bouzat. 
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 Art. 122-5. 
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 Art. 122-7. 
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 Art. R. 38, old Criminal Code. 
52
 Act of 17 January 1975. 
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 Crim. 15 nov. 1856, B., no. 358; 14 aôut 1863, D.P ., 64.I.399. 
54
 Amiens, 22 avr. 1898, S., 1899.2.1, note Roux; Crim. 27 janv. 1933, G.P., 1933.I.489. 
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de cassation formally recognised the general defence of necessity.56  The defence is now 
expressly laid down in article 122-7 of the new Criminal Code which states:  
 
“A person is not criminally liable who, faced with an existing or imminent danger 
which threatens themselves, another or property, carries out a necessary act to 
safeguard the person or property, except if there is disproportion between the 
means used and the gravity of the threat.”57 
 
This defence is available to all types of offences, but three conditions must be satisfied in 
order for it to be applied: there must be an existing or imminent danger, this danger must 
have necessitated the commission of the offence, and the offence must have been 
proportionate to the danger.  These conditions are very similar to those for the legitimate 
defence because the latter is really just a special form of the former, always requiring that 
the danger to which the defendant was responding be a criminal offence. 
  
European Convention on Human Rights 
There have been suggestions that the availability of self-defence and public defence 
where the defendant has made an honest, but unreasonable, mistake as to the necessity to 
take defensive action may breach the European Convention of Human Rights.  Fiona 
Leverick58 has argued that the law on this issue may violate the right to life, protected by 
Art. 2 of the Convention.  She considers that Art. 2 requires a criminal sanction to be 
applied where a person kills on the basis of an erroneous and unreasonable belief.  The 
European Court of Human Rights has consistently stated that exceptions to Art. 2 based 
on a mistaken belief, must be held for good reasons.  A counter-argument was put 
forward by the late Professor J.C. Smith59 who considered that the English law on this 
issue did not breach the Convention.  He pointed to the case of Re A (Children)60 where 
the Court of Appeal interpreted Art. 2 as only concerned with intentional killings and 
noted that intention is given a narrower meaning under the Convention than under 
English law.  Under the Convention it is restricted to direct intention, where the killing 
was the defendant’s purpose.  Thus, Professor Smith interpreted Re A (Children) as 
deciding that Art. 2 did not apply to someone who killed when they acted honestly in 
self-defence. His argument is not totally convincing, since the European Court of Human 
Rights has ruled that Art. 2 does not only apply to intentional killing, but also places an 
obligation on the state to protect the individual from any unjust deprivation of life, 
intention or not: LCB v UK.61 
 Both Professor Smith and Fiona Leverick agree that for this type of case, the most 
appropriate label might be manslaughter rather than murder.  The defence of self-defence 
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60
 [2001] Fam 149, [2001] 2 WLR 480. 
61
 (1999) 27 EHRR 212.  See Fiona Leverick, ‘The use of force in public and private defence and Article 2: 
A reply to Professor Sir John Smith’ [2002] Crim LR 963. 
 12 
could be removed where an unreasonable mistake has been made.  Instead, a partial 
defence of self-preservation could be developed which would avoid a potential breach of 
the European Convention because liability for manslaughter would be imposed. 
 
Burden of proof 
With self-defence the ordinary rules regarding the burden of proof apply with the 
defendant having to put forward some evidence to support the defence.  Once this 
evidence has been provided, the prosecution have to prove that the defence is not 
available.  Before the Homicide Act 1957 judges could withdraw provocation from the 
jury’s consideration if they thought a reasonable person would not have acted as the 
defendant did.  Under the 1957 Act, if there was evidence that a person was provoked to 
lose his or her self-control, the judge was required to leave the partial defence to the jury 
even where no reasonable jury could conclude that a reasonable person would have 
reacted as the defendant did.   
For the new defence of loss of control, if sufficient evidence of the partial defence is 
raised, the burden of disproving the defence of loss of control beyond reasonable doubt 
rests with the prosecution.62  The evidence will be sufficient where a reasonable jury, 
properly directed, could conclude that the partial defence might apply.  It will be a matter 
of law, and therefore for a judge to decide, whether sufficient evidence has been raised to 
leave the partial defence to the jury.63  Where there is sufficient evidence for the issue to 
be considered by the jury, the burden will be on the prosecution to disprove it.  This is the 
same burden of proof as most other defences including self-defence, but amounts to a 
significant departure from the previous law, as it gives the judge a control over whether 
there is a case fit to go to the jury.  As Norrie notes: 
Under the new law, the idea of a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged directs 
the jury to consider what is morally or politically acceptable, and, further, the judge 
has the power to remove cases from the jury's consideration. Interestingly it should 
be noted that, with regard to the power of removal, the matter is taken from the 
'actual' jury's consideration in the name of an 'ideal' jury.64 
 
Amanda Clough has observed that the 2009 Act is moving the law backwards in the 
direction it had been before 1957, in other words one could wonder whether the 
legislation in this respect is regressive rather than progressive.65 
 An interesting aspect of the French law of legitimate defence is the approach 
taken to the burden of proof.  Normally the defendant has to prove that the conditions of 
the defence have been satisfied.  On the issue of proportionality, where the threat was to 
the person the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the response was 
disproportionate, while with threats to property it is on the defendant.  More significantly, 
the legislator has sought to strengthen the protection of individuals in particularly 
dangerous situations by reversing this burden of proof.  Article 122-6 of the Criminal 
Code lays down two categories of presumption of legitimate defence:  
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“Art. 122-6. A person is presumed to have acted in a state of legitimate defence 
when they carry out the act: 
1.  To repel, at night, an entrance by force, violence or fraud into inhabited 
premises; 
2.  To defend himself against the authors of theft or looting carried out with 
violence.”66 
 
In such circumstances it would be up to the prosecution to prove that the individual was 
not acting in a state of legitimate defence.  For a long time this presumption was thought 
to be irrebuttable.  Thus, on several occasions an individual had entered a house for an 
amorous rendezvous with a woman inside.  Her husband was aware of his intentions and, 
having armed himself for his arrival, killed or injured him with a gun.  In such cases, the 
conditions of legitimate defence were not satisfied, but the prosecution could not rebut 
the presumption that the defence applied.67  In 1959 the Cour de cassation reversed its 
position on the matter, ruling that the presumption was rebuttable.68  This is the approach 
adopted by the new French Criminal Code of 1994.69    
 
Self-preservation 
Even after the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, if a woman in an abusive relationship kills 
her partner to protect herself from further violence in the future, she may have no defence 
to murder—under loss of control, diminished responsibility or self-defence. She will 
therefore face the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment and this sentence might be 
disproportionate to her personal guilt.  The Government ignored the Law Commission’s 
recommendation to remove the requirement of loss of control from the definition of the 
reformed defence in the 2009 Act and instead put this requirement at centre stage.  By 
doing so, the defence is clinging to its rather dubious social and moral roots which in 
France had long ago caused the equivalent defence to be dropped altogether.  By 
extending the defence to include fear of serious violence, but still requiring the defendant 
to have lost their control, there is a real tension in the current law.  In addition, by 
sticking to the framework of the old defence of provocation, the objective test and 
timeing factors are still determinant of whether the defence is available.  The problems 
with the defence of provocation/ loss of control are so fundamental that a mere 
redefinition has still left an unsatisfactory defence.  It is regrettable that with the Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009 the Government did not take the more radical option of moving 
away from a defence based on loss of control altogether.    
There is today a risk that battered women who kill their abusive partners will fall 
outside the new partial defence.  The key goal of trying to provide justice for women who 
had suffered years of abuse at the hands of their abusive partners who subsequently 
reacted by killing their abuser, might be achieved more effectively by abandoning a 
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defence based on loss of control altogether.  As there has been a historical reluctance to 
recognise a general defence of necessity in English law,70 unlike in France, the way 
forward would be to create a narrow focused form of a necessity defence: a defence of 
self-preservation.  This new partial defence of self-preservation would not be limited to 
battered women who killed;71 it could, for example, be used by victims of racial abuse or 
bullying who react by killing their tormentors.  The new defence could move the focus 
onto what ought to be the central issue of the defence: the terrible and dangerous abuse 
suffered by the victim. Undoubtedly, the woman's reaction to this abuse—killing—was 
wrong, and as a result this defence would only offer a partial defence.   
The defence of self-preservation could be defined to offer a defence where the 
offender, or another person with whom he or she is closely associated, has been 
repeatedly subjected to serious violence or tormenting behaviour.72 The defence could be 
available where force has been used not just to protect oneself, but also to protect 
another. For example, a son might kill his mother's violent boyfriend to protect her from 
further violence.73 The violence or torments would have had to be directed against a 
person, it would not be sufficient if they were directed against property.  This behaviour 
must have caused the offender to be in a state of severe emotional disturbance74 (a 
concept which incorporates both emotions of fear and anger) at the moment of the fatal 
attack.  The accused must have honestly believed that killing was the sole way to prevent 
grave future violence or torment to him or herself or another.75 That belief need not have 
been reasonable.76 Nor should there be any requirement that the amount of force used 
was reasonable.  A possible definition of the new defence is: 
A person will have a defence to murder so as to reduce their liability to manslaughter 
if he/she (or another person to whom he/she was closely associated) had: 
(a)     before the killing, been subjected by the victim to repeated, serious violence or 
tormenting behaviour; and 
(b)     reacted in a state of severe emotional disturbance in the honest belief that this 
was the only way to protect him or herself (or the other person) from further serious 
violence or torments.77 
 
As the defence is only a partial defence there would be no need for an imminent threat to 
have existed.  As regards the burden of proof, where the defendant had themselves been 
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the victim of domestic abuse there would be a presumption that the defence was 
available.   
If the victim is a spouse, lover or civil partner of the defendant who was abused 
by the defendant before the final attack, then consideration could be given by the 
Sentencing Council as to whether this should be treated as an aggravating factor, as in 
France, when determining the sentencing tariff. 
 
Self-defence and the burden of proof 
Politicians have been looking at reform options for the defence of self-defence.  The 
Conservative Party’s election manifesto promised greater protection for householders 
against intruders.78  Conservative politicians suggested that the right of self-defence 
should be lost only where the householder used ‘grossly disproportionate force’ on the 
intruder.79  But this is not a satisfactory solution for self-defence because the law of self-
defence operates in a wider variety of social contexts.  It is not just available to home-
owners confronted by a burglar, but also to someone involved in a fight in a local pub, or 
to a woman suffering domestic violence or to the police who shoot a suspect.  At the 
moment a single test of reasonable force applies in all these different contexts and a 
‘grossly disproportionate’ standard would not be appropriate. 
 Instead of trying to change the boundaries of self-defence, a more effective 
reform would be to change the burden of proof in appropriate cases.  Historically, the 
defence of self-defence has not succeeded for battered women who kill their abusive 
partners.80  We could consider building on the example of the French law in this field and 
applying a rebuttable presumption that the defence is available in the context of battered 
women who kill.  
 
Conclusion 
In attempting to move away from its indulgent approach to crimes of passion, the 
French criminal law has left no defence based on the concept of a loss of control.  
Instead the focus is on whether the defendant had a legitimate defence or acted out of 
necessity.  The French Parliament has used the rules on the burden of proof to try to 
make sure that justice is done in appropriate cases and adapted the rules on sentencing 
to treat domestic violence as an aggravating factor.  The retention of the concept of loss 
of control is an irrational distraction in English law and by retaining the conceptual 
framework of the old defence of provocation, unnecessary obstacles are being put in 
the way of defendants who deserve at least a partial defence.  In order to make sure that 
our law complies with the European Convention on Human Rights we need to 
reconsider the boundaries of the partial defences to murder.  Justice could be achieved 
by developing a defence of self-preservation, changing the burden of proof for the 
defence of self-defence in certain specific contexts and taking into account in 
sentencing the existence of domestic abuse.  While it is disappointing to be 
recommending legislative reform of the defences to homicide so soon after the passing 
of a parliamentary Act on the subject, the 2009 Act does not provide an adequate 
solution to the problems identified in the earlier defence of provocation.  The proposed 
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reforms will allow battered women who kill their abusive partners a partial defence 
(self-preservation), and in limited circumstances a complete defence (self-defence) in 
order that justice can prevail for both men and women.     
